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Qualified Immunity and Post-Release
Supervision
DEFINING A RIGHT
INTRODUCTION
In the realm of constitutional torts, courts seek to
balance citizens’ constitutional rights with officials’ effective
performance of their duties.1 In furtherance of this goal, the
judiciary articulated the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity, which limits liability when an official action does
not violate a clearly established “statutory or constitutional
right[ ] of which a reasonable person would have known.”2 In
fact, the Supreme Court has found that a clearly established
right is one that is “beyond debate.”3 While qualified immunity
may seem like a simple test, defining when a right becomes
clearly established often proves difficult. Because the underlying
purposes of qualified immunity are to afford predictability and
protection for officials and society, courts undercut the doctrine’s
primary functions when they split on whether a constitutional
issue is clearly defined.
Among other questions, federal circuit courts have split
on when it became clearly established that sentencing judges
must orally pronounce statutorily mandated terms of postrelease supervision, such as parole or sex offender registration.
While post-release supervision is generally permissible, issues
arise when the provision is required by statute, but state
sentencing judges fail to mention the appropriate term at
sentencing. When the judge omits these terms of post-release
supervision, relevant state authorities are still required to
enforce the statutory mandate. Federal circuit courts have
disagreed about when it became clearly established that
1 Stacey Haws Felkner, Proof of Qualified Immunity Defense in 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983 or Bivens Actions Against Law Enforcement Officers, 59 AM. JUR. PROOF OF
FACTS 3d 291 § 1 (2014).
2 Id.
3 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011).
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enforcing the omitted terms of post-release supervision was a
constitutional violation for purposes of qualified immunity. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second and Ninth
Circuits addressed this question within four months of each
other in 2013, arriving at different conclusions.4 In both cases,
plaintiffs relied on a 2006 case from the Second Circuit, Earley v.
Murray,5 as the point at which the law in question was clearly
established. In Earley the court granted a habeas petition on the
grounds that the petitioner’s term of post-release supervision
was not orally pronounced at sentencing, it was administratively
added, and was not a part of the sentence.6 In Vincent v. Yelich,
the Second Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs and concluded that
defendant state officials were not entitled to qualified
immunity.7 In Maciel v. Cate, however, the Ninth Circuit found
that Earley did not clearly establish the law.8 This inconsistency
provides an opportunity to investigate what qualified immunity
is and how the Second and Ninth Circuits’ applications accord
with precedent on the subject.
This note argues that the Second Circuit did not properly
apply the principles of qualified immunity in Vincent. Part I of this
note will offer a historical overview of post-release supervision in
New York. Part II will provide an analysis of the doctrine of
qualified immunity. Part III will address Second Circuit precedent
prior to Vincent v. Yelich and will analyze how the Vincent court
concluded that Earley v. Murray clearly established the law for
purposes of qualified immunity. This section will also address the
Ninth Circuit’s Maciel v. Cate decision and will analyze how that
court concluded that Earley did not clearly establish the law under
similar circumstances. Finally, Part V will argue that the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Maciel offers a better interpretation of the law
and leads to results more consistent with the central tenants of
qualified immunity.

4 See Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 2015 WL
132971 (Jan. 12, 2015); Maciel v. Cate, 731 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013).
5 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006).
6 Id. at 76.
7 718 F.3d at 160.
8 731 F.3d at 930, 933-34 & n.7.
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Inception of Jenna’s Law and the Judicial
Pronouncement Issue
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On November 6, 1997, Albany City Police responded to a
911 call from the basement apartment of 22-year-old nursing
student, Jenna Grieshaber.9 When police entered the
apartment, they found Jenna on the floor, brutally beaten,
stabbed through the neck with the post of her antique bed
frame.10 The perpetrator of this heinous murder was later
revealed to be one of Jenna’s neighbors, Nicholas Pryor.11 Mr.
Pryor was a parolee, released early after serving five years on a
stabbing conviction.12 In the wake of overwhelming public
response to this crime,13 state officials introduced a major
reform to the State’s sentencing rules.14
New York Penal Law Section 70.45, dubbed “Jenna’s Law”
in memory of the slain nursing student, overhauled New York’s
existing scheme of indeterminate sentences and discretionary
parole.15 In its place was imposed a system of determinate
sentences “followed by periods of mandatory post-release
supervision.”16 After Jenna’s Law passed on August 6, 1998,17
members of the legal community engaged in the sentencing
process operated under the belief that the post-release
supervision (hereinafter PRS) terms were a mandatory portion
of the sentence, regardless of whether the judge explicitly,
9 Grieshaber v. City of Albany, 279 A.D.2d 232, 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t.
2001); Defendant is Convicted in ‘Jenna’s Law’ Slaying, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/24/nyregion/defendant-is-convicted-in-jenna-s-lawslaying.html [hereinafter Defendant Convicted].
10 Grieshaber, 279 A.D.2d at 234; Defendant Convicted, supra note 9.
11 Defendant Convicted, supra note 9; Evelyn Nieves, Our Towns; Lost
Crusader Inspires ‘Jenna’s Law’, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/
1998/05/03/nyregion/our-towns-lost-crusader-inspires-jenna-s-law.html.
12 Defendant Convicted, supra note 9.
13 History, JENNA FOUNDATION FOR NON-VIOLENCE (2006), http://204.200.130.247/
History.html; Nieves, supra note 11.
14 See 1998 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1 (McKinney).
15 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45 (McKinney 2011) (requiring courts to state an
additional period of post-release supervision when imposing determinate sentences);
Nieves, supra note 11.
16 People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242, 244 (2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45 (“When
a court imposes a determinate sentence it shall in each case state not only the term of
imprisonment, but also an additional period of post-release supervision as determined
pursuant to this article.”).
17 Overview of Key Provisions of Chapter 1 of the Laws of 1998—Jenna’s Law,
N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., http://criminaljustice.ny.gov/
pio/jenna.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
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orally pronounced those terms at sentencing.18 In Gastelu v.
Breslin, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York held that “[u]nder New York law, a term of postrelease supervision is imposed automatically . . . regardless of
whether a defendant was informed of the term.”19 As a result of
this understanding, Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision (DOCCS)20 officials would “administratively impose”
the PRS term prescribed by Jenna’s Law, even if the term was
not orally pronounced by the judge at the sentencing hearing.
This administrative practice was first called into question in
2005 by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Catu.21
There, the court vacated petitioner’s guilty plea because he was
not informed of the PRS term before accepting the plea.22
However, Catu did not resolve “whether the administrative
imposition of PRS was itself unconstitutional.”23 The Second
Circuit addressed that question the very next year.24
In Earley v. Murray, decided in 2006, the Second Circuit
vacated an inmate’s PRS term, pending District Court
determination of whether his petition for habeas corpus was
timely filed.25 In reaching this decision, the court relied upon a
1936 Supreme Court case, Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler.26
In Wampler, a court clerk added as a condition of release that the
defendant had to pay his court-imposed fines.27 The sentencing
judge, however, did not order such a condition. The Court, in
vacating the term imposed by the clerk, held that “[t]he only
sentence known to the law is the sentence or judgment entered
upon the records of the court[,]” and non-judicial officers cannot
alter or affect that record.28 The Second Circuit noted that
Wampler was not directly analogous because the condition at
18 See, e.g., Gastelu v. Breslin, No. 03 CV 1339 JG, 2005 WL 2271933, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2005); People v. Adams, 13 A.D.3d 76, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t
2004); Deal v. Goord, 8 A.D.3d 769, 769-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2004); People v.
Bloom, 269 A.D.2d 838, 838 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2000).
19 Gastelu, 2005 WL 2271933, at *3.
20 In 2011, the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS)
and the New York State Division of Parole (Parole) were merged to form the New York
State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS). For the sake
of simplicity this note will refer to these entities both before and after the merger as
DOCCS, except where explicit differentiation is necessary.
21 Catu, 4 N.Y.3d at 244.
22 Id. at 244-45.
23 Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2010).
24 See Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006).
25 Id. at 76-77.
26 Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460 (1936).
27 Id. at 461-62.
28 Id. at 464.
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issue in Wampler was a matter of court discretion, whereas the
imposition of a PRS term is a statutory mandate.29 However,
the Second Circuit interpreted the Wampler holding broadly.30
The court held that Earley’s sentence was unconstitutional
because his term of post-release supervision was not orally
pronounced at sentencing and was only administratively added
later by DOCCS.31 Specifically, the court stated “[t]he
imposition of a sentence is a judicial act; only a judge can do it.
The penalty administratively added by the Department of
Corrections was, quite simply, never a part of the sentence.”32
Despite this finding, the court left open the possibility that a
sentence could be subsequently amended, stating that “[o]ur
ruling is not intended to preclude the state from moving in the
New York courts to modify Earley’s sentence to include the
mandatory PRS term.”33 So, although the administrative
imposition of PRS was found unconstitutional, the court
acknowledged the validity of Jenna’s Law itself and the
authority of the New York State courts to take corrective action
where a PRS term was administratively imposed.
After the Earley decision, “there was considerable
confusion in New York State courts as to the applicability of
the Second Circuit’s decision.”34 In numerous appellate
proceedings, two Departments of the New York Appellate
Division continued to uphold administratively imposed PRS
conditions.35 Furthermore, state trial courts often determined
that the decisions of the Appellate Division were directly
controlling precedent, as opposed to the Second Circuit’s
holding in Earley.36 This division among the New York state
courts focused on the proper scope of Earley. For example, the
First and Third Departments determined, in accord with
Earley, that DOCCS’s imposition of PRS conditions was
impermissible.37 However, by their reading, DOCCS was “only
enforcing, not imposing, a part of petitioner’s sentence which
Earley, 451 F.3d at 74.
Id. at 75.
31 Id. at 76.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Hardy v. Fischer, No. 08 Civ. 2460(SHS), 2010 WL 4359229, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2010).
35 Garner v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 39 A.D.3d 1019, 1019 (N.Y. App. Div.
3d Dep’t 2007), rev’d, Garner v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 10 N.Y.3d 358 (2008); People
v. Thomas, 35 A.D.3d 192, 193-94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2006).
36 See, e.g., People v. Edwards, No. 5588/2001, 2007 WL 969416, at *11 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2007); Quinones v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 14 Misc. 3d 390, 396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
37 People v. Sparber, 34 A.D.3d 265, 265-66; Garner, 39 A.D.3d at 1019.
29

30
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was automatically included by statute.”38 As such, DOCCS had
“not performed any judicial function” which would fall astray of
the principle of Wampler via Earley.39 More simply stated, the
First and Third Department had found that DOCCS did not add
anything to the prisoner’s sentences because there was nothing to
add; these PRS terms were a statutory mandate that required
DOCCS compliance, something quite distinguishable from the
discretionary condition imposed in Wampler. This divide was only
settled when the New York Court of Appeals finally agreed to
hear two cases from the First and Third Departments in 2007.40
Those two cases, Garner v. New York State Department of
Correctional Services and People v. Sparber, relied on New York
procedural law to hold that terms of post-release supervision
must be orally pronounced at sentencing in order to be valid.41
The Sparber court first observed that Jenna’s Law enumerated
no procedural framework for imposing its mandatory PRS
terms.42 The court, however, applied New York Criminal
Procedure Law Sections 380.2043 and 380.40(1)44 which require
that courts “must pronounce sentence in every case where a
conviction is entered and . . . [that] the defendant must be
personally present at the time sentence is pronounced.”45 The
court concluded that “[t]hese commands are unyielding.”46 In
holding plaintiffs sentence invalid, the Sparber court explicitly
determined that the sole remedy was not expungement of the
PRS term, as petitioners in these cases often argued, but rather,
resentencing.47 The court in Garner took a more cautious
approach, suggesting that officials “may,” not “shall,” seek
resentencing.48 Regardless, the New York Court of Appeals
clarified that appropriate resentencing would allow for the
required pronouncement of the PRS term and bring the sentence
Garner, 39 A.D.3d at 1019.
Id.
40 People v. Sparber, 34 A.D.3d 265 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2006), lv.
granted, 2007 N.Y. Slip. Op. 98853(U) (Aug. 9, 2007); Garner v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr.
Servs., 39 A.D.3d 1019 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2007), lv. granted, 2007 N.Y. Slip. Op.
8357 (Oct. 10, 2007).
41 People v. Sparber, 10 N.Y.3d 457 (2008); Garner v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr.
Servs., 10 N.Y.3d 358 (2008).
42 Sparber, 10 N.Y. 3d at 469.
43 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 380.20 (“The court must pronounce sentence in
every case where a conviction is entered.”).
44 Id. § 380.40(1) (“The defendant must be personally present at the time
sentence is pronounced.”).
45 Sparber, 10 N.Y.3d at 469 (internal quotations omitted).
46 Id. (citing Hogan v. Bohan, 305 N.Y. 110, 112 (1953)).
47 Id. at 471 (citing People v. Sturgis, 69 N.Y. 2d 816, 818 (1987)).
48 Garner v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 10 N.Y.3d 358, 363 n.4 (2008).
38

39
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into accord with all substantive and procedural New York
sentencing statutes. However, there were several issues that the
court failed to explicate in choosing such a remedy.
B.

Lingering Problems after Garner and Sparber: Standing
and Redress

Garner and Sparber settled the debate on the legality of
enforcing PRS terms that lacked judicial pronouncement, but
they left unanswered two important questions. First was who
had standing to challenge a potentially invalid PRS term and
specifically, whether DOCCS had standing to challenge
potentially invalid sentences in an effort to correct those
sentences. Second was how to identify and correct invalid
sentences. This was complicated by the fact that not every PRS
term was invalid, as the sentencing judge in many cases did
orally pronounce the term at sentencing.49 Thankfully, at least
for DOCCS, these questions were promptly answered by events
in June and December of 2008.
The first issue, standing, proved to be the easier of the
two issues to solve. Under New York Criminal Procedure Law
after Garner and Sparber, “[a]part from the defendant, the
right to appeal the propriety of a sentence is conferred
exclusively upon the prosecutor.”50 DOCCS was “limited to
informing the District Attorney of the county in which sentence
was imposed that it appears to be erroneous.”51 This was a
highly inefficient system, which often left DOCCS in the
awkward position of enforcing invalid sentences until prisoners
or the District Attorney brought corrective suit. The New York
State legislature, recognizing the inefficiency of this system,
passed two new provisions to New York Correction Law Section
601 and the New York Penal Law.52
49 See, e.g., People ex rel. Joyner v. N.Y. Div. of Parole, No. 75045/07, 2007
WL 1345702, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 8, 2007).
50 Murray v. Goord, 747 N.Y.S.2d 492, 495 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2002), aff’d, 1 N.Y.3d
29 (2003) (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 450.20(4), 450.30(2), (3) (McKinney 2004)).
51 Id. (citing N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 601-a (McKinney 2009).
52 See Memorandum from Gov. David A. Paterson on Senate Bill No. 8714
(June 30, 2008), available at http://image.iarchives.nysed.gov/images/images/138872.pdf.;
see also 2008 N.Y. Sess. Laws 3168 (McKinney). It stands to note that in the same bill,
the New York State legislature also amended Jenna’s Law to specifically require courts to
orally pronounce the period of PRS at sentencing. Specifically, the court amended the
language of Jenna’s Law to say “[w]hen a court imposes a determinate sentence . . . it
shall in each case state not only the term of imprisonment, but also an additional period of
post-release supervision . . . . ” 2008 N.Y. Sess. Laws 3168; see also Barry Kamins, New
Criminal Law and Procedure Legislation, 81 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 28, 28-29 (Feb. 2009).
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New York Correction Law Section 601-d and New York
Penal Law Section 70.85 took effect on June 30, 2008.53
Generally speaking, Section 601-d authorizes DOCCS to directly
inform the sentencing court when an inmate or parolee’s PRS
term may not have been orally pronounced at sentencing.54 In
practice, DOCCS did this by issuing a “601-d letter.”55 That
notification then imposed certain timing requirements upon the
court.56 New York Penal Law Section 70.85 serves as an
important modifier to the scope and effect of Section 601-d,
providing that:
This section shall apply only to cases in which a determinate
sentence was imposed between September 1, 1998, and the effective
date of this section, and was required by law to include a term of
post-release supervision, but the court did not explicitly state such a
term when pronouncing sentence. When such a case is again before
the court pursuant to [§ 601-d] of the correction law or otherwise, for
consideration of whether to resentence, the court may, notwithstanding
any other provision of law but only on consent of the district attorney,
re-impose the originally imposed determinate sentence of imprisonment
without any term of post-release supervision, which then shall be
deemed a lawful sentence.57

This statute modifies Section 601-d in two important ways.
First, it imports a temporal limitation on the effect of Section
601-d by limiting its application to improper PRS terms
imposed between the initial passage of Jenna’s Law and the
date these statutes were passed. Second, Section 70.85 tells us
that courts can choose, on consent of the District Attorney, to
resentence inmates and parolees without including a PRS
term, thereby abrogating the mandate of Section 70.45.
Commentators at the time correctly noted that the
legislature anticipated two scenarios that lead to this
abrogation.58 The first, which is explicitly contemplated in the
statute, was when a defendant was sentenced via plea bargain
and the plea agreement did not include the PRS term.59 The
New York Court of Appeals already held in People v. Catu that
failure to notify a defendant about a portion of his sentence
See 2008 N.Y. Sess. Laws 3168.
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 601-d (McKinney 2011).
55 See, e.g., People v. Guity, No. 2732-2002, 2011 WL 2315174, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 13, 2011); People v. Wells, 28 Misc. 3d 628, 630 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010);
People v. Pelsey, No. 91/2003, 2009 WL 3066662, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 2009).
56 N. Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 601-d(4)(a), (c), (d).
57 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 70.85, supplemental practice cmt. (McKinney 2008).
58 Kamins, supra note 52, at 29.
59 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.85.
53
54
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would enable the defendant to vacate that portion of the
sentence.60 The abrogation in Section 70.85 thus “avoids the
necessity of a plea vacatur” in these cases.61 The second
situation commentators contemplated was when a defendant
served his determinate sentence and was released from
prison.62 The concern here was that resentencing such a
defendant with a term of PRS would violate the Constitution’s
prohibition on double jeopardy.63 Irrespective of these issues,
DOCCS now had a tool with which it could address the problem
of improperly imposed PRS terms. From here, the department
just had to process the tens of thousands of felons in their
custody to whom the statutes may have applied.
The second issue following Sparber and Garner was how
to determine which inmates and parolees were serving
sentences with improper PRS terms. To address this problem,
DOCCS sought a declaratory judgment in New York State
Supreme Court.64 In its complaint, DOCCS sought judicial
approval of a plan to systematically correct sentences using
several state agencies to review sentences and refer qualified
persons for resentencing.65 The action also sought an injunction
that would allow DOCCS to maintain custody of different
classes of defendants for specified periods of time.66 DOCCS
argued that this stay of release was necessary to alleviate two
substantial policy concerns.67 The primary fear was that
without a clearly defined plan in the wake of Garner and
Sparber, there would be a “proliferation of piecemeal, detached
and inconsistent civil proceedings [that would] push the
criminal justice system to the brink of chaos.”68 Furthermore,
DOCCS felt it needed a clear plan to “address the potential
public safety crisis inherent in releasing tens of thousands of
violent felons into the community without supervision.”69
DOCCS’s request for injunctive relief focused upon a
portion of the DOCCS plan that classified defendants into three
groups.70 Defendants in Subclass A were individuals who were
4 N.Y.3d 242, 244 (2005); see also Kamins, supra note 52, at 29.
Kamins, supra note 52, at 29.
62 Id.
63 Id.; see People v. Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 198, 214-17 (2010); but see People v.
Lingle, 16 N.Y.3d 621, 630-31 (2011).
64 State v. Myers, 22 Misc. 3d 809, 811 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 811-12.
67 Id. at 811.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 811 n.5.
60

61
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released on parole and then violated a term of their PRS and
were sent back to jail.71 Defendants in Subclass B were
individuals who were still in jail serving their determinate
sentence and had yet to be released.72 Finally, defendants in
Subclass C were individuals who had been released from jail
either on conditioned release or to PRS who had not violated
the terms of their release.73
On December 24, 2008, the New York State Supreme
Court, Albany County, in State v. Myers, held that the complaint
constituted “hypothetical questions resulting from” the passage
of Section 601-d and that any decision “would be the equivalent
of a[] request for an advisory opinion.”74 While the court declined
to stamp DOCCS’s proposed plan with their imprimatur or
enjoin the release of defendant classes, they did not point to any
deficiencies in the plan itself. In fact, this proposed plan and its
inmate class system guided DOCCS actions going forward.
DOCCS could systematically process the records of those still
incarcerated in various state prisons, those considered to be in
Subclass B, and have them resentenced as they were discovered.
However, as for those inmates in Subclasses A and C, DOCCS
could not learn about their potentially invalid PRS terms until
they either violated the terms of their supervision or brought an
action challenging their PRS.
II.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

The broad overlying purpose of qualified immunity is to
afford officials the ability to “reasonably . . . anticipate when
their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.”75 In
providing such predictability, qualified immunity seeks to
balance citizens’ constitutional rights and officials’ effective
performance of their duties.76 Furthermore, the doctrine
“protects public officials performing discretionary functions
from personal liability in a civil suit for damages ‘insofar as
Id.
Id.
73 Id. Under New York Penal Law § 70.45, defendants would serve six-sevenths
of their determinative sentence if they exhibited good behavior. The remaining oneseventh of their determinate sentence was referred to as conditioned release. Conditioned
release is served under conditions similar to PRS; however, it counts towards the
determinate prison sentence as opposed to the PRS term. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45,
practice cmt. (McKinney 2011).
74 Myers, 22 Misc. 3d at 819.
75 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (quoting Davis v. Scherer,
468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)).
76 Id.
71
72
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their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’”77 This means that while the doctrine looks to afford
predictability and protection for officials, it will not do so at the
expense of citizens’ constitutional rights. In seeking to strike
the appropriate balance, the Second Circuit has developed the
following test: “[W]hether an official protected by qualified
immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly
unlawful official action generally turns on the ‘objective legal
reasonableness’ of the action, . . . assessed in light of the legal
rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.”78
The Second Circuit’s qualified immunity analysis is
thus an objective analysis of whether an official violated a
clearly established right.79 Specifically, the Second Circuit has
articulated that “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in
determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it
would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.”80 In defining “clearly
established” the Supreme Court has stated:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.
This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified
immunity unless the very action in question has previously been
held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.81

On that same point, the Court has held that “existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.”82 In addition to articulating the
pertinent standard for qualified immunity, the Supreme Court
has made clear that qualified immunity is intended to afford
“government officials breathing room to make reasonable but
mistaken judgments,” and to “protect[] all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”83 This,
even more so than the standard for what is clearly established,
77 Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 162 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
78 Id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19).
79 Id.
80 Id. (quoting Saucier v. Kats, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)); see also Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) (“[T]he right allegedly violated must be defined at the
appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established.”).
81 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (citations omitted).
82 Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. alKidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011)).
83 Id. (quoting al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085).
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demonstrates the Supreme Court’s deference to official action
in qualified immunity inquiries.
Such deference to officials may seem contrary to basic
notions of the Constitution’s purpose. Some might argue that
any time a person’s constitutional rights are violated they
should have judicial recourse. As previously noted, however, the
most basic policy consideration for qualified immunity is the
balancing of citizens’ constitutional rights with officials’ effective
performance of their duties.84 It is important to understand this
balance and why the Supreme Court finds value in this balance.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald the Court noted that:
[I]t cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against
the innocent as well as the guilty—at a cost not only to the
defendant officials, but to society as a whole. These social costs
include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy
from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from
acceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger that fear of
being sued will “dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the
most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of
their duties.”85

The court in Harlow also noted that these social costs would be
“incurred whether or not the official ultimately is vindicated of
liability[,]”86 and that this conclusion is premised on the
rationale that many constitutional tort claims are “frivolous.”87
Taken together, these considerations show the Court’s
awareness of the dangers of unfettered access to a constitutional
tort cause of action. Similarly, constitutional law is often quite
complicated, particularly to those citizens outside the legal
community. In light of these considerations, the Court has
determined that the line for liability should be drawn at plain
incompetence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that
early resolution of the qualified immunity defense is an

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (footnote omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949));
see also Alan K. Chen, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Qualified Immunity: Unpacking the
Issues, Presentation at the 27th Annual Section 1983: Civil Right Litigation Program
(Apr. 16, 2009), available at 2009 WL 2436799, at *3.
86 Chen, supra note 85, at *3; see also N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17(2)(a) (McKinney
2013) (“[T]he state shall provide for the defense of the employee in any civil action or
proceeding in any state or federal court . . . which is brought to enforce a provision of [42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 or 1983].”); id. § (3)(a) (“The state shall indemnify and save harmless its
employees in the amount of any judgment obtained against such employees in any state
or federal court . . . . ”).
87 Harlow, 457 U.S. 827.
84

85
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essential component of its proper functioning.88 Commentators
have noted “[t]he purpose of qualified immunity is to dismiss
insubstantial cases at the outset of litigation.”89 Perhaps the best
way to conceptualize the purpose and policy surrounding
qualified immunity is to view the doctrine as “an immunity from
suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . [that] is
effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”90
The Supreme Court’s most recent take on qualified
immunity articulates two important principles in PRS cases. In
Stanton v. Sims, a police officer forcibly entered private
property while pursuing a fleeing suspect.91 The Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and held that the
officer was entitled to qualified immunity.92 The Court found
that no clearly established law prohibited the officer’s actions
for two reasons. First, state court decisions in California had
upheld the lawfulness of such an entry.93 The Supreme Court
found it “troubling” to impose “personal liability for damages”
on a state officer under federal law “based on actions that were
lawful according to courts in the jurisdiction where [the officer]
acted.”94 Second, despite a Ninth Circuit ruling that one of its
earlier decisions clearly established the relevant law, the Court
noted that “two different District Courts in the Ninth
Circuit . . . granted qualified immunity” to officers in such
situations.95 The Court found that such a finding bolstered the
presumption of qualified immunity.96
In arriving at its conclusion, the Supreme Court
definitively stated that “[w]e do not express any view on
whether [the officer’s] entry into [plaintiff’s] yard . . . was
constitutional.”97 However, the Court reasoned that such a
finding was not dispositive of whether or not to grant qualified
immunity, and was more concerned with whether the
constitutional rule applied by the Ninth Circuit was “beyond
debate.”98 Because of the conflicting state and federal cases on
the issue, the Court concluded that while the officer “may have
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 817-18.
Chaim Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155, 1157 (2005).
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 512 (1985).
Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 4 (2013) (per curiam).
Id. at 7.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011)).
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been mistaken in believing his actions were justified . . . he was
not ‘plainly incompetent.’”99 This case exemplifies the stringent
standard for finding a “clearly established right.” Even though
the Ninth Circuit had already addressed the issue presented in
Stanton, subsequent contradictory state and district court
decisions granting qualified immunity created a situation
where the right was not clearly established.
The Stanton decision affects qualified immunity in PRS
cases in two important respects. First, it supports the position
that courts should consider the New York state court decisions
in the wake of Earley to determine whether a right was clearly
established.100 Second, the “overwhelming consensus” from the
district courts following Earley that DOCCS officials were
entitled to qualified immunity bolsters the presumption that
these officials are in fact entitled to qualified immunity.101 It
makes sense to consider these factors in determining whether a
right was clearly established. Qualified immunity serves to
protect officials’ best efforts in the face of uncertain law.
Certainly, when state and district courts disagree on an issue,
the law is uncertain. As an objective assessment of what a
reasonable official should have known, there should be some
degree of unanimity amongst the courts on a right before it is
deemed clearly established. It does not make sense to hold
officials who are not legal experts liable when even judges
cannot agree on a matter of law.
III.

WHEN WAS THE RIGHT CLEARLY ESTABLISHED?

A.

Cases Leading up to Vincent v. Yelich

The next chapter in the history of PRS is the litigation
brought by current and former New York State inmates who
were subjected to invalid PRS terms. Prior to the Second
Circuit’s Vincent decision, district courts hearing these types of
cases routinely granted DOCCS officials qualified immunity.102
Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 333, 341 (1986)).
See Garner v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 39 A.D.3d 1019 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d
Dep’t 2007); People v. Thomas, 35 A.D.3d 192 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2006).
101 Locantore v. Hunt, 775 F. Supp. 2d 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Henderson
v. Fischer, No. 10 Civ. 2182(PAC)(HBP), 2013 WL 638930, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2013);
Ruffins v. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 2d 290, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Pendleton v. Goord,
849 F. Supp. 2d 324, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Earley v. Annucci, Civ. No. 9:08-CV-669 (FJS/RFT),
2011 WL 7112917, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2011), report and recommendation adopted by No.
9:08–CV–669 (FJS/RFT), 2012 WL 264210 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 30 2012).
102 See, e.g., Henderson, 2013 WL 638930 at *4; Ruffins, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 299;
Pendleton, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 331; Earley, 2011 WL 7112917 at *6; Vincent v. Yelich, 812 F.
99

100
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Indeed, the Southern District of New York’s decision in
Betances v. Fischer, decided contemporaneously with Vincent in
the Second Circuit, was an anomaly in concluding that DOCCS
officials were not entitled to qualified immunity, as a “state
court decision could not and did not place Earley’s holding in
doubt.”103 In addition to the district courts, the Second Circuit
also routinely granted DOCCS officials qualified immunity for
actions taken prior to the passage of Section 601-d.104
The Second Circuit’s decisions regarding PRS, in
particular, deserve close examination. In Scott v. Fischer, a
state prisoner brought a Section 1983 action alleging that
DOCCS officials deprived her of due process by failing to
remove her administratively-added PRS term either before or
after she was rearrested for violating the terms of her PRS.105
The Second Circuit examined these claims by considering
whether the law was clearly established for purposes of
qualified immunity both before and after Earley.106
First, the court addressed whether the right was clearly
established prior to Earley. The court initially determined that
People v. Catu did not clearly establish the law because the
case did not address whether “administrative imposition of
PRS was itself unconstitutional.”107 The court also dismissed
the petitioner’s claim that the right in question was defined in
Wampler, concluding that the lack of a statutory mandate in
Wampler rendered it factually distinguishable.108 Nonetheless,
it was acknowledged that the Earley court relied on
Supp. 2d 276, 281 (W.D.N.Y. 2011); Locantore, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 687; but see Williams v.
Fischer, No. 08-CV-4612 (DLI)(VVP), 2010 WL 3924688, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010);
Santiago v. Fischer, No. 09-CV-1383 (DLI)(RML), 2009 WL 3852001, at *5-*6 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2010). In both Williams and Santiago, defendants were arrested and incarcerated
after the passage of § 601-d without judicial intervention, action clearly against the
mandates of § 601-d. As such, they fall somewhat beyond the auspices of this discussion. It
is important to note though that qualified immunity was never a blanket protection and
hinges heavily upon the pertinent temporal facts pertaining to the sentencing of each
defendant. While cases are brought in various state courts, the vast majority of cases are
brought in federal courts. See, e.g., Jackson v. Cuomo, No. 2008-0462, 2008 WL 2677252
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008); People ex rel. Benton v. Warden, 20 Misc. 3d 516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
The skew to the federal system probably in no small part results from the availability of
damages and attorney’s fees for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
103 Bentley v. Dennison, 852 F. Supp. 2d 379, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff ’ d sub
nom. Betances v. Fischer, 519 F. App’x 39 (2d Cir. 2013).
104 See Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Joyner-ElQawi-Bey v. Russi, 439 F. App’x. 36, 37 (2d Cir. 2011); Rivers v. Fischer, 390 F. App’x. 22,
22 (2d Cir. 2010); King v. Cuomo, 465 F. App’x 42, 44-45 (2d Cir. 2010).
105 Scott, 616 F.3d at 104-05.
106 Id. at 106-09.
107 Id. at 106.
108 Id. at 107.
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Wampler.109 At this point the court made an important
distinction, noting that, in Earley, the court granted relief
because the right to not have an aspect of sentence
administratively imposed was clearly defined for purposes of
granting habeas corpus under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).110 However, a conclusion that a
right was “clearly established” for purposes of relief under the
AEDPA “does not require a conclusion that it was ‘clearly
established’ in the qualified immunity context, which governs
the conduct of government officials who are likely neither
lawyers nor legal scholars.”111 Thus, a higher level of scrutiny
applies when determining whether a right was clearly
established for purposes of qualified immunity. Furthermore,
“[t]here is a well-established ‘general principle that, absent
contrary direction, state officials and those with whom they
deal are entitled to rely on a presumptively valid state statute,
enacted in good faith and by no means plainly unlawful.’”112
Accordingly the court determined that:
In the presence of a statute that requires all sentences for certain
crimes to be accompanied by mandatory PRS, and New York cases
that routinely upheld the administrative imposition of that PRS, we
conclude that it was not clearly established for qualified immunity
purposes prior to Earley that the administrative imposition of PRS
violates the Due Process Clause.113

Next, the court addressed whether the right was clearly
established law after Earley. The court began by saying
“[w]hether Earley itself sufficed to clearly establish the
unconstitutionality of administratively imposed PRS for a
reasonable New York State correctional official may be open to
question . . . .”114 In Scott, the court then made two important
findings. First, they noted that after Earley the fact that “two
Departments of the New York Appellate division thereafter
continued to find the practice constitutional” raised real
concerns about whether the unconstitutionality was clearly
established.115 Further, the court stated that “[i]n
circumstances of such apparent judicial confusion as to the
Id. at 106.
Id.; see Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) (2012).
111 Scott, 616 F.3d at 106.
112 Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 208-09 (1973)).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
109
110
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constitutional propriety of a statutory mandate, qualified
immunity might well continue to shield state officials acting
pursuant to that statute.”116 Yet, the court declined to make a
firm determination on this matter and held that “[t]o resolve
this appeal . . . we need not and therefore do not decide
precisely when it became clearly established that the
administrative imposition of PRS, even when statutorily
mandated, is unconstitutional.”117 However, the court did add
that even if DOCCS had authority to unilaterally revoke
plaintiff’s sentence, there was nothing to suggest that the
Department “had such an affirmative legal duty, much less a
clearly established one.”118 Furthermore, DOCCS “was not
obligated affirmatively to seek resentencing for defendants with
administratively-imposed PRS until 2008, when New York
Correction Law Section 601-d became effective.”119 The Second
Circuit ultimately held that defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity for actions taken prior to Earley, and that
the plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead facts establishing a claim
for action taken after Earley.120
Three other Second Circuit cases are relevant to PRS
qualified immunity.121 In Rivers v. Fischer, an inmate alleged
that DOCCS officials violated his constitutional rights by
administratively imposing a PRS term and by failing to release
him.122 The Second Circuit held that DOCCS officials were
entitled to qualified immunity on both of the plaintiff’s
claims.123 Regarding the second claim in particular, the court
stated that “[g]iven the ambiguity in the law” after Earley,
“defendants . . . are entitled to qualified immunity.”124 In
Joyner-El-Qawi-Bey v. Russi, the plaintiff claimed that DOCCS
officials violated his constitutional rights by administratively
Id. at 107-08.
Id. at 108.
118 Id. at 109-10.
119 Id. at 111; see N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 601-d (McKinney 2011).
120 Id. at 108-09.
121 It should be noted that, unlike Scott, Rivers, Joyner-El-Qawi-Bey, and King
are all reported in the federal appendix as opposed to the federal reporter. This is because
they are slip opinions. As such, they do not bear the same precedential effect as an
officially reported opinion. Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1 in fact states that such
opinions “shall have no precedential effect.” However, Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 demands that such opinions, issued after January 1, 2007, can be cited to.
Since Rivers, Joyner-El-Qawi-Bey, and King are directly on point in relation to Vincent
and Betances, they should have been considered in those cases and should be considered
in future PRS litigation before the Second Circuit.
122 390 F. App’x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2010).
123 Id. at 24.
124 Id.
116
117
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imposing PRS and continuing to enforce the PRS until his
resentencing in 2009.125 The Second Circuit affirmed the
District Court’s decision, which found that: “the defendants
were not on notice that administratively imposing a term of
supervision on [plaintiff] was unlawful when they did so no
later than April 6, 2006[,]” and “defendants were justified in
believing that the sole remedy for their error was a
resentencing proceeding.”126 Accordingly, the court concluded
that qualified immunity was appropriate.127
Finally, in King v. Cuomo, the plaintiffs brought due
process and double jeopardy claims.128 The due process claim
alleged that altering the judicially imposed determinate
sentence through the addition of the administratively imposed
PRS term “upset [Plaintiffs’] expectations of finality[.]”129
Regarding the double jeopardy claim, plaintiffs asserted that
their PRS terms were not orally pronounced at sentencing and
that the “administrative imposition of a PRS term following a
judicially imposed determinate prison term constitutes
‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’”130 The King court
affirmed the District Court’s decision and stated that “because
neither clearly established principles of double jeopardy nor
due process prohibited defendants from administratively
imposing legislatively mandated PRS terms before 2006, or
from obtaining judicial resentencing of offenders already
released from their determinate prison terms before 2010, the
district court correctly granted dismissal.”131
These cases answer the question of whether a right was
clearly established in the wake of Earley. Both Rivers and King
enumerate that the right was not clearly established after
Earley because there was substantial confusion as to the state of
the law. In Joyner-El-Qawi-Bey and King, the court dealt more
explicitly with the state of the law both before and after Earley.
Before Earley, the Second Circuit stated that there was no
“notice” or clearly established law that would allow DOCCS
officials to know that the imposition of PRS was unconstitutional.
Additionally, the court found that, after Earley, these officials
were “justified” in believing resentencing was the appropriate
Joyner-El-Qawi-Bey v. Russi, 439 F. App’x 36, 37 (2d Cir. 2011).
Joyner-El-Quwi-Bey v. Russi, No. 09-CV-2047 (JG), 2010 WL 1222804, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2010), aff ’ d sub nom. Joyner-El-Qawi-Bey, 439 F. App’x 36.
127 Joyner-El-Qawi-Bey, 439 F. App’x at 37.
128 465 F. App’x 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2011).
129 Id. at 45.
130 Id. at 44 (quoting United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480, 487 (2d Cir. 2002)).
131 Id. at 45.
125

126
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remedy because that was the accepted course of action by all
parties involved in the process. Thus, Scott clarified that prior to
Earley, there was no clearly established law prohibiting the
administrative imposition of PRS. Moreover, Rivers, Joyner-ElQawi-Bey, and King clarified there was no clearly established
law after Earley prohibiting administrative imposition of PRS,
and there was no clearly established law that would prevent the
enforcement of a PRS term or resentencing of defendants to
correct an otherwise invalid PRS term.
B.

Vincent and Betances

When the Second Circuit decided Vincent v. Yelich132
and Betances v. Fischer133, it marked a stark departure from
existing precedent. Vincent involved a combined appeal from
two district court cases granting qualified immunity to DOCCS
officials.134 The combined complaints, brought under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, alleged that defendants violated plaintiffs’ due
process rights as announced in Wampler.135 The District Court
held that “defendants were entitled to qualified immunity
because the unconstitutionality of the administrative
imposition of PRS was not clear prior to Earley.”136 In
particular, the courts found that “[s]tate [court] cases decided
after Earley[] made it unclear that administrative imposition of
such conditions was unconstitutional.”137
On appeal, plaintiffs contested defendants’ entitlement
to qualified immunity, arguing that Earley had “determined
that the rights asserted by plaintiffs had been sufficiently
clearly established decades earlier by Wampler.”138 The Second
Circuit assessed this argument and the history of PRS and
concluded that Earley “did not rule that those rights were
clearly established by Wampler with respect to a defense of
qualified immunity[.]”139 Upon further analysis, however, the
court determined that “Earley[ ] itself, decided on June 9, 2006,
did clearly establish the unconstitutionality of the administrative
imposition or enforcement of post release conditions that were not

132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

718 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2013).
519 F. App’x 39 (2d Cir. 2013).
Vincent, 718 F.3d at 160.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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judicially imposed.”140 The court then reversed the judgment of
the district courts and held that the DOCCS Executive Deputy
Commissioner was not entitled to qualified immunity.141
In arriving at this conclusion, the Second Circuit
focused upon two issues: (1) whether the state court decisions
in the wake of Earley could lead to a finding that the law was
not clearly established, and (2) the effect of Second Circuit
precedent in denying qualified immunity to the Vincent
defendants.142 In determining that Earley clearly established
the law for purposes of qualified immunity, the Second Circuit
held that subsequent state court decisions contrary to Earley
did not call the holding of that case into doubt. The court
reasoned that “[s]tate and local officials are required to comply
not just with state law but with federal law as well.”143 The
court further concluded that subsequent state court decisions
did not demonstrate Earley was “unclear in its holding[,]” and
that “[f]ederal constitutional standards . . . define the
requirements of procedural due process.”144
The Second Circuit also determined that its precedent
on qualified immunity in PRS cases was inapplicable in the
Vincent case. While the court did not address the cases
“decided by summary order,” namely King,145 Rivers,146 and
Joyner-El-Qawi-Bey,147 the court did spend significant time
distinguishing Scott. Specifically, the court articulated three
reasons why Scott was inapplicable: (1) the Scott complaint did
not argue that DOCCS failed to relieve the plaintiff of PRS or
remove the PRS term from petitioner’s record; (2) the argument
that DOCCS had violated petitioner’s due process rights by not
taking action on the invalid PRS term was only raised in
opposition to the motion to dismiss; and (3) Anthony Annucci,
Acting Commissioner of DOCCS, was not a defendant in
Scott.148 The third rationale offered by the Second Circuit
exposes a glaring peculiarity of the Vincent decision.
The Second Circuit in Vincent did not affirm the
holdings of the district courts in their entirety but rather
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
142 Id. at 169.
143 Id. at 170.
144 Id. at 169 (first alteration in original) (quoting Russell v. Coughlin, 910
F.2d 75, 78 n.1 (2d Cir. 1990)); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980).
145 King v. Cuomo, 465 F. App’x 42 (2d Cir. 2011).
146 Rivers v. Fischer, 390 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010).
147 Joyner-El-Qawi-Bey v. Russi, 439 F. App’x 36 (2d Cir. 2011).
148 Vincent, 718 F.3d at 171-72.
140

141
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affirmed them only so far as they applied to one defendant,
Anthony Annucci.149 The Second Circuit identified Annucci as
DOCCS Executive Deputy and Commissioner and legal
counsel.150 The court found that, as such, he “coordinated the
work of the entire [DOCCS] agency with respect to
intergovernmental . . . issues.”151 Moreover, Annucci’s duties in
this capacity included seeking “a resolution of the PRS issues”
and communicating with the courts “to have persons who
should . . . have had PRS imposed as part of their sentences[]
resentenced.”152 The Second Circuit determined that Annucci
possessed particular knowledge of PRS litigation due to his role
as DOCCS counsel and that Annucci, in light of that
knowledge, may have been responsible for unacceptably slow
PRS reform within DOCCS.153
On the same day Vincent was decided, the Second
Circuit issued a decision in another PRS case, Betances v.
Fischer.154 Betances was an appeal from one of the few district
court cases that denied qualified immunity to DOCCS
officials.155 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision.156 Betances is significant because the decision
utilized the reasoning the Second Circuit applied to Anthony
Annucci in Vincent to deny qualified immunity to all of the
named DOCCS officials.157 However, it provided no rationale for
extending that line of reasoning.158 Recall that in Vincent, the
court granted qualified immunity to all defendants other than
Annucci on the argument that he had a special role as DOCCS
counsel.159 This case greatly expands the scope of liability under
Vincent, which at first glance appeared to specifically level
liability only against Annucci. Taken together, Vincent and
Betances represent a broad rejection of qualified immunity for
DOCCS officials acting pursuant to Jenna’s Law. Moreover,
these two cases firmly rely upon Earley as the point at which

Id. at 178.
Id. at 160.
151 Id. at 173 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 173-74.
154 Betances v. Fischer, 519 F. App’x 39 (2d Cir. 2013).
155 Bentley v. Dennison, 852 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff ’ d sub nom.
Betances, 519 F. App’x 39.
156 Betances, 519 F. App’x at 41.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d 157, 173 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 2015 WL
132971 (Jan. 12, 2015).
149
150
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judicial pronouncement of statutorily mandated terms of PRS
became clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity.
C.

Maciel v. Cate

Standing in contrast to Vincent is the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Maciel v. Cate.160 This case centered on a California
statute nearly identical to Jenna’s Law in the defects surrounding
its implementation. California Penal Code Sections 290 and 3000
mandate that certain classes of sex offenders must register with
the state after finishing their determinate sentences.161 However,
as was the case with Jenna’s Law in New York, many sentencing
courts did not orally announce that term of parole at
sentencing.162 As such, due process litigation of the same sort that
followed Jenna’s Law ensued and the Ninth Circuit engaged in a
quite similar analysis to determine when it became clearly
established that a judge must orally pronounce statutorily
mandated PRS terms at sentencing.
In Maciel, the petitioner appealed the district court’s
denial of his petition for habeas corpus.163 In his habeas
petition, petitioner contended that California state courts failed
to apply the principles of Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler to
his case.164 The district court had concluded that this claim was
without merit and denied the petition.165 However, the court
granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of “whether the
imposition of a parole term violated Wampler.”166
On appeal, petitioner asserted the issue granted under
the District Court’s certificate and also included a claim
challenging the imposition of sex-offender registration
requirements.167 This second argument asserted that California
violated petitioner’s due process rights “by imposing a parole
term and a sex-offender registration requirement that were not
part of his criminal judgment.”168 In support of this argument,
the petitioner asserted that Earley demonstrated that Wampler
160
161

(West 2014).

Maciel v. Cate, 731 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 931; CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 2007); CAL PENAL CODE § 3000

162 See, e.g., Maciel v. Cate, No. CV 10-7089-AG (RNB) (C.D. Cal. 2011); In re
Douglas, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 582, 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2011); In re Maciel, No.
B224912 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2010).
163 Maciel, 731 F.3d at 930.
164 Id.
165 Maciel, No. CV 10-7089-AG (RNB).
166 Maciel, 731 F.3d at 931.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 930.
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was clearly established law.169 The Ninth Circuit determined
that petitioner’s original claim was no longer a live controversy
and dismissed that portion of the appeal.170 The court also
granted petitioner’s request to expand the certificate of
appealability,171 finding that the question petitioner raised was
“debatable amongst jurists of reason” and was “adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.”172 The Ninth
Circuit further held that “[w]ith respect to [petitioner’s] claim
that imposition of the sex-offender registration requirement
violates Wampler, we hold that the state court’s decision was
neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law.”173 The court also evaluated whether
the statutory provisions in question were punitive or regulatory
in nature and determined that because they were regulatory,
Wampler was inapplicable on that ground.174 While the court
acknowledged that “[t]here are various grounds on which the
California courts reasonably could have denied Maciel’s
Wampler claim”, it affirmed the decision of the district court
because “parole and registration requirements are imposed by
law and are not subject to the sentencing court’s discretion.”175
To reach this conclusion, the court analyzed Wampler
and questioned the Second Circuit’s assumptions about
extending the scope of Wampler in Earley.176 Notably, the Ninth
Circuit found it reasonable to determine that Wampler was
inapplicable to mandatory sentencing schemes because that
case “expressly applies only to discretionary sentencing
terms . . . .”177 Moreover, the court reasoned that such a finding
could be supported by the conclusion that when a state statute
requires imposition of a PRS term, an official does not violate
due process by “carrying out that punishment.”178 In fact, in
addressing the Second Circuit’s conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
stated “[i]f, in light of the underlying statutory scheme, the
court’s judgment of conviction and sentence of imprisonment
require that the defendant be subject to additional punishment

169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id. at 934.
Id. at 931.
Id. at 932.
Id. (quoting Muth v. Fondren, 676 F.3d 815, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2012)).
Id. at 930.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 937.
Id. at 934-35.
Id. at 934.
Id. at 935.
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after release, an administrator arguably has not ‘amended’ the
judgment in any sense by carrying out that punishment.”179
The Ninth Circuit also cast doubt on Wampler’s
application to mandatory PRS schemes because Wampler
“concerned illegitimate detention, not the collateral consequences
of that detention.”180 The court thus concluded that a state court
could have reasonably determined that Wampler was “limited [in
its holding] to claims involving actual custody.”181 The Ninth
Circuit has thus articulated two critical facets of Wampler that
render it arguably inapplicable to mandatory schemes of PRS:
discretionary sentencing and actual custody.
IV.

VINCENT AND MACIEL—WHY MACIEL OFFERS A BETTER
RESULT

A.

Vincent—What the Second Circuit Failed to Consider

There are three major problems with the Second Circuit’s
determination in Vincent that Earley clearly established the law
for purposes of qualified immunity. First, the court inexplicably
dismissed the effect of state court cases in arriving at its
conclusion. Second, the court failed to fully apply or consider
prior cases in the Second Circuit and its district courts on the
subject. Third, the court misused the doctrine of qualified
immunity by applying it to certain defendants in a subjective
manner. Exacerbating this final issue is that in Betances v.
Fischer,182 the Second Circuit extended the scope of its limited
holding in Vincent, to apply to any DOCCS defendant.
The first two problems with Vincent are best viewed in
light of the Supreme Court decision in Stanton v. Sims.183 In
Stanton, the Court found it “troubling” to impose liability on
state officers under federal law for taking actions that were
“lawful according to courts in the jurisdiction where [the
officer] acted.”184 Additionally, the Court noted that although
the Ninth Circuit determined one of its prior precedents clearly
established the law, two district courts within the circuit
granted qualified immunity in similar circumstances after that
case. The Court felt that such a scenario called the clearly
179
180
181
182
183
184

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 934 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Betances v. Fischer, 519 F. App’x 39, 40-41 (2d Cir. 2013).
Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3 (2013).
Id. at 7.
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established finding into doubt and “bolstered” a finding of
qualified immunity.185 Conversely, in Vincent, the Second
Circuit dismissed the effect of state court decisions after Earley
and also failed to adequately consider the fact that not only had
the circuit itself granted qualified immunity to officials in PRS
cases, but the district courts within the Second Circuit also
routinely granted qualified immunity.186
The Vincent court determined that state court decisions
following Earley did not make Earley “unclear in its holding.”187
The court further found that “federal constitutional
standards . . . define the requirements of procedural due
process.”188 These findings are clearly at odds with Stanton. The
Vincent court’s utter disregard of the state court decisions
following Earley is enough to show error in the court’s decision.
However, it is also important to consider just how this omission
affected the decision.
It makes sense that DOCCS officials, as state actors,
would look to state courts for guidance on an issue pertaining
to state sentencing. Beyond intuition, the law supports the
proposition that DOCCS officials should have been able to
place weight on the state court’s decisions. It is a wellestablished principle of federalism that state courts are not
bound by the decisions of federal district and circuit courts on
matters of state law.189 This rule is only abrogated where there
is evidence of bad faith in the statute at issue or where the
statute is unconstitutional.190 Furthermore, federal courts
generally defer to state courts on sentencing matters.191 This
rule is the result of the belief that sentencing issues are
generally matters of policy and should be left for the state
legislature to decide.192 While the Second Circuit in Earley
found that administrative imposition of PRS terms was
unconstitutional, they never ruled that Jenna’s Law itself was
unconstitutional.193 This means that after Earley, Jenna’s Law
was still a valid New York State statute. Furthermore, New
Id.
Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d 157, 178 (2d Cir. 2013).
187 Id. at 169.
188 Id. at 169 (quoting Russell v. Coughlin, 910 F.2d 75, 78 n.1 (2d Cir. 1990))
(first alteration in original); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980).
189 ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989); Diamond “D” Constr.
Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 200 (2d Cir. 2002).
190 Diamond “D” Constr. Corp., 282 F.3d at 200.
191 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(citations omitted).
192 Id. at 28.
193 Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71, 74-77 (2d Cir. 2006).
185
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York state court decisions in the wake of Earley upheld DOCCS
action as valid on the grounds that DOCCS officials were “only
enforcing, not imposing, a part of petitioner’s sentence which
was automatically included by statute.”194 This interpretation
places DOCCS action outside of the administrative imposition
prohibited by Earley. Decisively, Garner and Sparber, the cases
that finally settled the issue, resolved the matter on New York
procedural rather than constitutional grounds.195 These cases
exemplify the courts’ confusion about how to define Jenna’s
Law and DOCCS action under the law. State and federal courts
clearly held different views of the issue. As such, the state
court decisions do in fact make Earley “unclear in its holding”
despite the contrary assertion of the Second Circuit196
The second issue in Vincent was the court’s failure to
consider the district court cases granting qualified immunity as
well as the failure to consider its own precedent in the wake of
Earley. The Vincent court did not consider any of the district
court cases in the wake of Earley that granted qualified
immunity.197 This is erroneous under Stanton and undoubtedly
impacts the application of qualified immunity. The Supreme
Court has determined that for official action to fall beyond the
auspices of qualified immunity, “existing precedent must have
placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.”198 In Scott, the Second Circuit acknowledged that
qualified immunity “governs the conduct of government
officials who are likely neither lawyers nor legal scholars.”199
Therefore, in a situation where federal district court judges
continued to grant qualified immunity on an issue, it is hard to
fathom how that issue is beyond debate, or how those not
versed in the law could be expected to make any sort of
reasonable determination as to the state of the law.
Even if Earley did clearly establish the law, under Stanton
the abundance of district court cases after Earley is enough to cast
doubt upon the issue. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that
the Second Circuit granted qualified immunity in PRS cases in
Scott and also in Rivers, King, and Joyner-El-Qawi-Bey. While
194 Garner v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 39 A.D.3d 1019, 1019 (N.Y. App.
Div. 3d Dep’t 2007).
195 People v. Sparber, 10 N.Y.3d 457, 469-70 (2008); Garner, 10 N.Y.3d at 360.
196 Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d 157, 169 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 2015 WL
132971 (Jan. 12, 2015).
197 See id. at 169-70.
198 Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.
Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011)).
199 Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2010).
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those last three cases are slip opinions and admittedly of debatable
legal authority, it is not practical to ignore these decisions.200 While
the vaulted courtrooms of the federal circuits may not consider slip
opinions as authoritative legal precedent, that distinction is lost
upon a layperson. This concern is particularly acute in the PRS
context because all of these lawsuits were brought against a
relatively small number of people. In particular, Brian Fischer, the
Commissioner of DOCCS at the relevant time, is named in nearly
every single PRS case including the three Second Circuit slip
opinions.201 However, others such as Anthony Annucci and Robert
Dennison, the former Commissioner of the Department of Parole,
are named with near equal frequency. These individuals certainly
relied upon cases in which they were personally involved to
understand the state of the law, regardless of the precedential
effect of those decisions. It would defy qualified immunity’s
practical foundation to ignore these cases.
One final issue with the Vincent decision is that the
Second Circuit applied the objective qualified immunity test in
a subjective fashion. The court asserted that Anthony Annucci,
as DOCCS counsel, could not have misunderstood Earley or
found that case ambiguous.202 In support of this proposition, the
Court cited testimony from Annucci that admittedly
demonstrates his knowledge of Earley and his understanding of
the holding.203 These considerations are irrelevant, however,
because qualified immunity is not a subjective individual
defense. Rather, it is an objective defense based on an
individual’s official position. The ability to assert this defense is
not lost based on individualized qualifications or opinions held
by that person. In fact, the Supreme Court has specified, “a
right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right.”204 The Second Circuit’s subjective analysis regarding Mr.
Annucci was improper and constitutes a misapplication of the
law of qualified immunity. Furthermore, in Betances v. Fischer,
the Second Circuit extended the subjective line of reasoning
applied to Annucci to several other defendants. In so doing, the
court determined that the defendants “ha[d] not presented any
See 2D CIR. R. 32.1.1; FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
See Joyner-El-Qawi-Bey v. Russi, 439 F. App’x 36 (2d Cir. 2011); King v.
Cuomo, 465 F. App’x 42 (2d Cir. 2011); Rivers v. Fischer, 390 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010);
see also Vincent, 718 F.3d 157; Betances v. Fischer, 519 F. App’x 39 (2d Cir. 2013).
202 Vincent, 718 F.3d at 168.
203 Id.
204 Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
200
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basis . . . for distinguishing between the claims against Annucci
and the claims against the other defendants.”205 Such an
explanation leaves much to be desired and creates more
questions than answers based on its reliance on arguments
applicable solely to Anthony Annucci.
This analysis demonstrates why, as a matter of law, the
Second Circuit’s Vincent holding was incorrect. The Second
Circuit’s reasoning is incompatible with the Supreme Court’s
Stanton decision and applies the objective qualified immunity
analysis in a subjective fashion. The Ninth Circuit’s framework,
as established in Maciel, is preferable for qualified immunity
decisions. Maciel squarely dealt with how and when the judicial
pronouncement of statutorily mandated PRS terms became
clearly established. While Maciel admittedly addresses this
question in a different context than Vincent, it directly examines
the evolution of the issue through Wampler and Earley.
Furthermore, Maciel offers valuable insight as to how an inquiry
into whether a right was clearly established should be conducted.
As such, Maciel provides the proper analysis for this question.
B.

Why Maciel’s Analysis Produced Better Results

In the future, courts should apply the Maciel decision’s
reasoning because the result better comports with the goals of
qualified immunity. Maciel is a more astute analysis of the law as
it developed through Wampler and Earley. Particularly relevant
is the Maciel court’s examination of the discretionary term and
actual custody issues in Wampler. The Ninth Circuit determined
that because of these variances in Wampler, “fair minded jurists
could disagree” about Wampler’s application in Earley, which
plainly contradicts the Vincent court’s decision. However, in light
of what constitutes a clearly established right, Maciel offers a
better analysis of the law and provides better results.
Before addressing the arguments in favor of Maciel, it is
important to look at the relationship between Maciel and
Vincent. Maciel was a habeas corpus case, not a constitutional
tort claim like Vincent, where qualified immunity was asserted
as a defense. While, the “clearly established” test is utilized in
both the habeas corpus and qualified immunity contexts, it is a
much more stringent test as applied to qualified immunity.206 In
the habeas corpus context, the test is whether “fair minded
205
206

Betances, 519 F. App’x at 41.
See Maciel v. Cate, 731 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2013); Vincent, 718 F.3d at 166.
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jurists could disagree.”207 In the qualified immunity context, the
test is “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”208 Despite
these differences the analysis for what constitutes clearly
established generally follows the same analytical framework in
both the habeas corpus and qualified immunity contexts.
The most important consideration in Maciel is the effect
of a mandatory statute upon the analysis. The Maciel court
determined “that when a state statute ‘require[s] that the
defendant be subject to additional punishment after release’ an
administrative official does not violate due process by ‘carrying
out that punishment,’ even when no judge pronounced it.”209
This is the exact point made by the New York State courts
after Earley. Likewise, the Maciel court primarily relied upon
this point in determining that there was no clearly established
right. This determination goes beyond the principle from
Stanton that state court decisions should be considered in a
qualified immunity analysis. Maciel questioned the very
foundation of an official’s liability under Vincent. The Ninth
Circuit speculated that not only is the law not clearly
established, but also that no violation may exist in enforcing a
mandatory PRS statute. Earley used Wampler for the
proposition that a sentence “may not be increased by an
administrator’s amendment.”210 But this has little application
to the issue of DOCCS enforcement of a valid state statute.
Maciel also distinguishes Wampler as a case involving
actual, corporeal custody.211 It is uncertain just how this case
applies to a supervision scheme that is the collateral
consequence of detention.212 Similar to the discrepancy between
mandatory and discretionary, the Ninth Circuit found that this
was a valid ground by which the state courts could distinguish
Wampler.213 This matter, while not as critical as the mandatory
versus discretionary issue, further exemplifies the tentative
grounds that connect Earley and Wampler, and demonstrates
the confusion later courts had in applying Earley. Because
207 Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
208 Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 162 (2d Cir. 2012).
209 Letter from Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor General, State of N.Y. Office of the
Att’y General, to Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court, United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit (Oct. 8, 2013) (on file with author) (quoting Maciel, 731 F.3d at 930).
210 Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2006).
211 Maciel, 731 F.3d at 934.
212 Id.
213 Id.
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Earley was an extension and amplification of the law, its scope
and proper application were ambiguous. Maciel recognizes this
and speaks to the reasonableness of the California state courts
in distinguishing Wampler from their statutorily mandated
PRS scheme. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis is reflective of how
the Second Circuit should have applied qualified immunity to
DOCCS officials’ actions taken in response to Jenna’s Law.
Maciel’s real value is that it highlights the Second Circuit’s
logical leap to extend Wampler to Earley. Where the law is
stretched so thin, questions arise as to its applicability. This was
precisely the problem after Earley. State and federal courts did not
know how to interpret or apply the law. As such, there was a great
deal of confusion on behalf of both judges and the DOCCS officials
charged with continuing to enforce Jenna’s Law. Maciel’s analysis
is appropriate because it recognizes this confusion and the state of
the law at the relevant times as it applied in California. Maciel’s
analysis is also favorable because it exposes the tentative ground
upon which Earley rests. These considerations point to a finding
that the law was not clearly established.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s Maciel approach is appropriate
because it acknowledges the tenuous connection between
Wampler and Earley.214 The Second Circuit’s Earley decision
took this connection for granted. In the context of a radical
redefinition of the law, as occurred with the Earley decision,
there will inevitably be growing pains. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged the existence of these growing pains.215 Thus, in
Stanton, the Court determined that state court decisions and
federal district court decisions granting qualified immunity
should be considered in determining whether a right was clearly
established.216 This is true even when a circuit court has made a
determination that the right was clearly established.217 The
Second Circuit failed to see the confusion generated by the
decision in Earley because they did not consider the appropriate
factors articulated in Stanton and applied in Maciel.
It is still unclear whether judges at sentencing must orally
pronounce statutorily mandated terms of post-release
supervision. Perhaps they should. Wampler may even be the
214
215
216
217
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answer to this question; or rather, extending the holding of
Wampler to cover statutory mandates as well as administrative
imposition may be the answer. However, Earley does not make
that clear. Earley only presents the idea that it is a possibility.
Yet, just as Maciel and the numerous New York state court
opinions following Earley demonstrate, this possibility is easily
rebutted because the case of a statutory mandate is so readily
distinguishable from administrative imposition. Significantly,
Maciel also identifies that Earley is an insufficient basis for
remedy. Qualified immunity will not hold officials responsible
when such a state of legal confusion exists. This is not to say that
those affected by Jenna’s Law should be left without a remedy.
There are myriad remedies available to aggrieved individuals,
including state Article 78 proceedings, habeas corpus petitions,
and seeking of a 601-d letter.218 These actions could result in
removal of the PRS terms or resentencing, which are certainly
valid remedies considering that these were all lawfully convicted,
violent felons. What cannot stand is the existence of a damages
suit against DOCCS officials. To find otherwise defeats the stated
purposes of qualified immunity: to protect “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”219 The
decision in Maciel better reflects these considerations. Thus,
Maciel offers a superior approach to defining when it became
clearly established that sentencing judges must orally pronounce
statutorily mandated terms of post-release supervision for
purposes of qualified immunity.
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